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Abstract
We improve the best known competitive ratio (from 1/4 to 1/2), for the online multi-unit
allocation problem, where the objective is to maximize the single-price revenue. Moreover,
the competitive ratio of our algorithm tends to 1, as the bid-profile tends to “smoothen”.
This algorithm is used as a subroutine in designing truthful auctions for the same setting: the
allocation has to be done online, while the payments can be decided at the end of the day.
Earlier, a reduction from the auction design problem to the allocation problem was known
only for the unit-demand case. We give a reduction for the general case when the bidders have
decreasing marginal utilities. The problem is inspired by sponsored search auctions.
1 Introduction
We improve the best known competitive ratio (from 1/4 to 1/2), for the online multi-unit allocation
problem, which in turn gives a factor of 2 improvement for the online multi-unit auction problem.
Moreover, the competitive ratio of our algorithm tends to 1, as the bid-profile tends to “smoothen”.
We also give a reduction from the auction problem to the allocation problem when the bidders
want multiple copies of the item with decreasing marginal utilities for them. Earlier, such a
reduction was known only for the unit-demand case.
Definition 1.1. Online Multi-unit Auction Problem for single demand We have for
auction multiple copies of a single item, where the copies are coming online. We have no prior
knowledge of how many copies of the item will be produced. Each bidder has a utility ui for one
copy of the good, and bids a value bi at the beginning of the auction.
The problem is to design an allocation and pricing scheme that has the bids bi as input and
has the following properties:
• (Truthfulness) The auction mechanism should be truthful.
• (Perishable Good) As a new copy comes, either it is allocated to some bidder, who wins the
copy, or it is discarded.
• The prices charged to the winning bidders are determined at the end of the auction, when
there are no more copies left.
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The goal of the auction is to maximize the revenue of the auctioneer.
The corresponding online multi-unit allocation Problem for single demand is the following:
Definition 1.2. Online Multi-unit Allocation Problem for single demandWe want to sell
multiple copies of a single item, where the copies are coming online. We have no prior knowledge
of how many copies of the item will be produced. Each interested bidder sends her bid bi at the
beginning of the auction.
The problem is to design an allocation scheme that has the bids bi as input and as a new copy
comes, either it is allocated to some bidder, who wins the copy, or it is discarded. All the winning
bidders are charged the same amount at the end of the auction and is less than the bid of all the
winning bidders.
The goal of the auction is to maximize the revenue of the auctioneer.
A generalization of the above problem is the multiple demand problem.
Definition 1.3. Online Multi-unit Auction Problem for Multiple demand Just like in
the single demand problem we have for auction multiple copies of a single item, where the copies
are coming online. But in this problem the bidders may bid for multiple copies of the item. The
bidders make multiple bids for each copy.
The problem is again to design an allocation and pricing scheme that satisfies the all the
conditions of truthfulness, perishableness of the item and charging the price at the end. The goal
is to maximize the revenue of the auctioneer.
Definition 1.4. Competitive Ratio Given the bids {bi} and the number of copies of the item
that is produced let OPT be the revenue of the optimum single price auction. If the expected
revenue generated by an online multi-unit auction mechanism is REV then the Competitive Ratio
of the mechanism is REV/OPT .
Theorem 1.5. We design an allocation algorithm for the online multi-unit auction problem for
unit demand, that achieves a competitive ration of 1/2.
Corollary 1.6. We have a truthful auction mechanism for the online multi-unit auction problem,
that achieves a constant competitive ratio.
In the Online Multi-unit Auction problem, we have for auction multiple copies of a single item,
where the copies are coming online. We have no prior knowledge of how many copies of the item
will be produced. Each bidder has a utility ui for one copy of the good, and bids a value bi at the
beginning of the auction. As a new copy comes, either it is allocated to some bidder, who wins
the copy, or it is discarded. The prices charged to the winning bidders are determined at the end
of the auction, when there are no more copies left. The goal of the auction is to maximize the
revenue of the auctioneer. We use competitive analysis, and compare this revenue to the optimal
“single price” revenue, that is the optimal revenue that could have been obtained by charging the
same price for all the copies allocated, having known the number of copies produced and the true
utilities of the bidders. Further, we want the auction to be strategyproof, that is, the auction is
so designed that bidding truthfully (that is bi = ui) is a dominant strategy for every bidder.
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Mahdian and Saberi [11] showed that this problem can be reduced to the Online Multi-unit
Allocation problem, with a constant factor lost in the competitive ratio. The allocation problem
is exactly as before, except that one can assume that the bidders bid their true utility, and the
allocation algorithm is also restricted to be single priced, the price being determined at the end of
the algorithm. As before, the revenue of the algorithm is compared to the optimum single price
revenue, having known the number of copies.
If a bidder wants more than one copy of the item, then he submits multiple bids. The
allocation problem is essentially the same. However, the auction problem is more difficult because
of truthfulness. The auction has to now consider the possibility that the bidder lies about some
subset of his bids, as opposed to lying about the only bid in the unit-demand case.
The problems are inspired by sponsored search auctions, which are a major source of revenue
for search engines like Google, Yahoo and MSN. The copies correspond to search queries and the
bidders are the advertisers. The auction problem considered here is also a natural extension of
the line of work on digital goods auction: from unlimited supply ([6, 7, 8, 9]) to limited supply
([1, 2, 4]), to unknown supply ([11] and this paper). For the sponsored search auction setting, the
multiple demand case is more realistic and our reduction for this case is of significant interest.
It can be easily seen that the competitive ratio of any deterministic algorithm for the allocation
problem is arbitrarily small. So it is actually surprising that a randomized algorithm can even get
a constant competitive ratio. The reason for this difficulty is that the revenue of the algorithm,
as a function of the number of copies allocated can have many “peaks” and “valleys”. For any
deterministic algorithm, an adversary can make sure that the algorithm either ends up in a valley,
or is stuck on a small peak while the optimum is at a larger peak elsewhere. Our allocation
algorithm actually solves the following general online problem: let f : N → R be any “sub-
linear”1 function of natural numbers. Consider an online algorithm that is trying to choose n to
maximize f(n). The algorithm starts at n = 0, and at each time step, can choose to stay at n, or
go to n+ 1. The competitive ratio of the algorithm is
f(n)
max1≤i≤m{f(i)}
where m is the total number of time steps. We give an algorithm that achieves a competitive
ratio of 1/2 for this problem.
The simplicity of our algorithm is quite appealing. Whenever the algorithm is at a peak, it
has to decide if it has to stay at the peak, or try to get to the next one. What the algorithm does
is to simply wait at the current peak for a period of time chosen uniformly at random between 1
and the maximum distance between peaks seen so far.
The proof of the competitive ratio relies on case analysis since the optimal revenue and the
expected revenue of the algorithm vary depending on the total number of copies seen. A good
idea of how the analysis goes can be had by considering the following instance: suppose there is
one bid of 1 and many bids of ǫ ≪ 1. In this case the algorithm waits for a time chosen u.a.r
between 1 and 1/ǫ. If the number of copies seen is m ≤ 1/ǫ, then the optimal revenue is 1, while
the expected revenue is 1− x+ x
2
2
(where x = ǫm), which is at least 1/2 when x ≤ 1. If m ≥ 1/ǫ
1 what we mean is f(n)/n is decreasing. A function of the form f(n) = cna satisfies this condition if and only
if a is at most 1.
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then the optimal revenue is ǫm, while the expected revenue is ǫm− 1/2 ≥ ǫm
2
.
The reduction in [11] gives a constant competitive ratio for the auction problem. The auction
is based on random sampling with computing optimal “price offers”. But when run in an online
setting, the prices offered decrease over time, due to which a bidder might regret not getting a
copy earlier as the price decreased at a later time. The authors of [11] take care of this situation
by a clever implementation that works only when all bidders want only one copy. It is not
truthful when the bidders can submit multiple bids. We circumvent this difficulty by combining
the random sampling technique with the VCG auction. However, we only get an asymptotic
competitive ratio, that is the ratio tends to 1, as a certain bidder dominance parameter tends to
0.
The problems we consider were first studied by Mahdian and Saberi [11]. Other variants have
been considered, for instance when the supply is given while the bidders arrive and leave online
[10, 3]. Also there is a huge work on digital goods and random sampling auctions. Another
interesting case is when the bidders have constant marginal utilities for the copies, but have daily
budgets. [4, 1] gave an auction for this case with known supply. Extending it to the online setting
is an important open problem.
2 An Algorithm for the Online Multi-unit Allocation Problem
Without loss of generality assuming that the bids are u1 ≥ u2 ≥ · · · ≥ un, the revenue obtained
by allocating l units of the item is lul. Let 1 = a1 < b1 < a2 < b2 < a3 < b3 < . . . be the critical
points of the function lul, that is, the function lul is non-decreasing as l increases from ai to bi,
for all bi < l < ai+1 we have biubi > lul and biubi ≤ ai+1uai+1 .
The algorithm is in one of two states, ALLOCATE or WAIT. When it is in ALLOCATE,
it allocates the next copy of the item. When it is in WAIT, it discards the next copy. The
description of the algorithm is completed by specifying when it transits from one state to the
other.
The algorithm is initially in ALLOCATE. It transits from ALLOCATE to WAIT when the
number of copies allocated (X) is equal to bi for some i. It transits from WAIT to ALLOCATE
when the number of copies discarded (Y ) is equal to a random variable, T , for waiting time. T is
reset every time the algorithm transits to WAIT. T is picked so that it is distributed uniformly
between 0 and Di, where
Di = max
j≤i
(aj+1 − bj)
(recall that X = bi). We further want to maintain the invariant that Y never exceeds T . Equiv-
alently, the value of T can only increase during a run of the algorithm.
We still have to specify how T is picked. Because of the condition that T can only increase,
we cannot pick T independently every time we transit to WAIT. Note that if Di = Di−1, then
we don’t have to change T at all. If Di > Di−1, then
• w.p. Di−1
Di
don’t change T ,
• with the remaining probability pick T uniformly at random from the interval [Di−1,Di].
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It is easy to see that the resulting T is distributed uniformly in [0,Di]. Note that in case T is
not changed, then Y is already equal to T , and we transit back to ALLOCATE immediately.
Equivalently, we don’t transit to WAIT at all.
Pseudocode for the Algorithm
1. initialize STATE = ALLOCATE, i=1, X=Y=T=0;
2. when a new copy is produced
3. If (STATE = ALLOCATE)
4. Allocate the copy to the next bidder;
5. X ++;
6. If (X = bi)
7. If (Di > Di−1)
8. With prob 1− Di−1
Di
9. set T to a random number from the interval [Di−1,Di];
10. STATE = WAIT;
11. i ++;
12. If (STATE = WAIT)
13. Discard the copy;
14. Y ++;
15. If (Y = T )
16. STATE = ALLOCATE
17. GO TO line 2.
3 Competitive Analysis
In this section we show that the expected revenue of our algorithm, ALG, is at least half of the
optimal revenue on hindsight, OPT . Let M be the number of copies that is produced at the end
of the day. Let bi < M ≤ bi+1.
Case 1: If M ≤ ai+1, then OPT is biubi .
Case 2: If ai+1 < M , then OPT is MuM .
Recall that X is the number of items sold by the algorithm. Therefore, ALG = E[XuX ]. We
approximate ALG in the two cases as follows.
In Case 1, if X ≤ bi then uX ≥ ubi , and if X > bi then uX ≥ uai+1 . Hence we have that
ALG ≥ Pr[X < bi]E[X|X < bi]ubi + Pr[X = bi]biubi + Pr[X > bi]E[X|X > bi]uai+1
Also note that by definition ai+1uai+1 ≥ biubi = OPT . Hence
uai+1 ≥
biubi
ai+1
=
OPT
ai+1
.
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Substituting for the values of ubi and uai+1 , we get
ALG
OPT
≥ Pr[X < bi]E[X|X < bi]
1
bi
+ Pr[X = bi] + Pr[X > bi]E[X|X > bi]
1
ai+1
. (1)
In Case 2, we use the fact that uX ≥ uM , so ALG ≥ E[X]uM , and since OPT =MuM , we need
to prove that E[X] is at least M/2.
E[X] = Pr[X < bi]E[X|X < bi] + Pr[X = bi]bi + Pr[X > bi]E[X|X > bi]. (2)
We now give a way to calculate the various probabilities and expectations needed.
Definition 3.1. For all i ≥ 1 let Ti be the value of the random variable T chosen at phase i.
Ti is the number of number of items we plan to discard before allocating the (bi + 1)-th
element. Also note that Ti is distributed uniformly between 0 and Di, and Ti−1 ≤ Ti for all i.
Also, it is easy to see from the description of the algorithm that X ≥M −Ti−1 when X < bi, and
X =M − Ti when X > bi. This gives us the following lemmas. Let M
′ :=M − bi.
Lemma 3.2. For all i ≥ 1 the following statements hold, (let T0 = 0),
1. X < bi ⇔ Ti−1 > M
′.
2. X = bi ⇔ Ti−1 ≤M
′ and Ti ≥M
′.
3. X > bi ⇔ (Ti−1 < M
′ and Ti < M
′) ⇔ Ti < M
′.
Lemma 3.3.
E[X|X < bi] ≥M − E[Ti−1|Ti−1 > M
′] =M −
M ′ +Di−1
2
.
E[X|X > bi] =M − E[Ti|Ti < M
′] =M −
min{M ′,Di}
2
.
However, the probability of the events X < bi, X = bi and X > bi depend upon the order of
Ji := bi +Di−1, ai+1 and M . So we consider all possible orders of these 3 quantities separately.
Table 1 shows the probabilities for all the cases.
3.1 Analyzing all the Cases
A few observations first: from Lemma 3.3,
E[X|X < bi] =M −
M ′ +Di−1
2
≥
M
2
since Di−1 ≤ bi =M −M
′ implies M ′ +Di−1 ≤M . And when M
′ ≤ Di,
E[X|X > bi] =M −
M ′
2
=
M + bi
2
.
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Pr[X < bi]
= Pr[Ti−1 > M
′]
Pr[X = bi]
Pr[X > bi]
= Pr[Ti < M
′]
Case 1a
Ji < M ≤ ai+1
Di−1 ≤M
′ ≤ Di
0 1− M
′
Di
M ′
Di
Case 1b
M ≤ Ji < ai+1
M ′ ≤ Di−1 ≤ Di
1− M
′
Di−1
M ′
Di−1
− M
′
Di
M ′
Di
Case 1c
M ≤ ai+1 ≤ Ji
M ′ ≤ Di−1 = Di
1− M
′
Di−1
0 M
′
Di−1
Case 2a
Ji < ai+1 ≤M
Di−1 < Di ≤M
′ 0 0 1
Case 2b
ai+1 ≤M ≤ Ji
M ′ ≤ Di−1 = Di
1− M
′
Di−1
0 M
′
Di−1
Case 2c
ai+1 ≤ Ji < M
Di−1 = Di ≤M
′ 0 0 1
Table 1: Probability of the event X < bi, X = bi and X > bi for the six different cases
Case 1a: [Ji ≤ M ≤ ai+1] Set x =
M ′
Di
and y = Di
ai+1
. Then M
′
ai+1
= xy and bi
ai+1
= 1 − y.
Substituting for the probabilities and expectations in (1),
ALG
OPT
≥ 1− x+ x
(
1 +
xy
2
− y
)
= 1 +
x2y
2
− xy =: α.
dα
dx
= y(x− 1) ≤ 0.
Therefore α is minimized when x = 1, and at this point, α = 1− y/2 ≥ 1/2 since y ≤ 1.
Case 1b: [bi ≤ M ≤ Ji ≤ ai+1] As observed earlier, we have that E[X|X < bi] ≥
M
2
≥ bi
2
and
E[X|X > bi] =
M+bi
2
≥ bi. Setting x =
M ′
Di−1
and using (1) again,
ALG
OPT
≥ (1− x)
1
2
+ x
(
1−
Di−1
Di
+
Di−1
Di
bi
ai+1
)
.
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It is enough to prove that Di−1
Di
(
1− bi
ai+1
)
≤ 1
2
. This follows from the fact that ai+1 = bi +Di ≥
2Di−1.
Case 1c: [bi ≤ M ≤ ai+1 ≤ Ji] As before we have that E[X|X < bi] ≥
M
2
≥ bi
2
and E[X|X >
bi] =
M+bi
2
≥ ai+1
2
. The last inequality follows because ai+1 ≤ Ji = bi +Di−1 ≤ bi +M . Plugging
these back in (1) gives ALG
OPT
≥ 1
2
.
Case 2a: [Ji ≤ ai+1 ≤M ] From (2) and Lemma 3.3, E[X] =M −
Di
2
≥M/2 since M ≥ Di.
Case 2b: [ai+1 ≤M ≤ Ji] In this case, it is enough to show that both E[X|X < bi] and E[X|X >
bi] are bigger than M/2. From Lemma 3.3, E[X|X < bi] ≥
M
2
. E[X|X > bi] =M −
M ′
2
≥ M
2
.
Case 2c: [ai+1 ≤ Ji ≤M ] The analysis is identical to Case 2a.
In fact, the competitive ratio of our algorithm is 1 − ǫ if ǫ ≥ max{Di−1
bi
, Di
ai+1
}. The proof is
essentially the same as above.
4 Designing Truthful Mechanism
Let B = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of bidders. Each bidder can make multiple bids. We will design a
truthful mechanism which has good competitive ratio. Our mechanism will use an online multi-
unit allocation algorithm as a sub-routine. Under a bidder-dominance assumption, the competitive
ratio of our mechanism will be (1−ǫ)α where α is the competitive ratio of the allocation algorithm
we use as our subroutine.
The Mechanism: We divide the set of bidders into two groups S and T by placing each
bidder randomly into either of the groups. On each set of bidders S and T we will have
fictitious runs of the allocation algorithm. Let the fictitious run of the allocation algorithm
on the set S (respectively T ) allocates x(S, k) (respectively x(T, k)) copies when k copies
are produced.
Now when the j-th copy is produced, if j is even we compute x(S, j/2). If at that time the
number of copies allocated to bidders in T is less than x(S, j/2)(1−6γ) then we allocate the
j-th copy to T otherwise discard the copy. Similarly, if j is odd we compute x(T, (j +1)/2)
and if the number of copies allocated to bidders in S is less than x(T, (j + 1)/2)(1 − 6γ)
then we allocate the j-th copy to S otherwise discard the copy.
Finally let xfinal(S) and xfinal(T ) copies are allocated to bidders in S and T respectively.
The prices charged are the VCG payments, that is, as if we ran a VCG auction to sell
xfinal(S) copies to bidders in S.
Note that the even indexed copies will be allocated only to bidders in T and the odd-indexed
copies will be allocated only to bidders in S. But the bids of bidders in S decides how many
(odd-indexed) copies will be allocated to bidders in T and vice versa. This mechanism is similar
to that in [8] on digital good auction with unlimited supplies except that in [8] the bids of bidders
in S decides the cut off price for bidders in T and vice-versa.
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If M is the number of copies of the item that are finally produced we denote by OPT =
OPT (B,M) the revenue obtained by the optimal single price allocation algorithm.
Definition 4.1. For any price p and any bidder i we denote by n(i, p) the number of bids of
bidder i that are more than p.
We define the bidder dominance parameter η as
η =
maxi,p n(i, p)p
OPT
.
Theorem 4.2. The above mechanism is a truthful mechanism. If all the bids are from a finite
set of prices (say Q) and if
1
η
= Ω
(
log
(
|Q|
δ
)(
1
ǫ2
))
and γ = ǫ/8 then with probability more than (1 − δ) our mechanism guarantees a revenue of at
least αOPT (1− ǫ) on expectation, where α is the competitive ratio of the allocation algorithm that
we use as the subroutine.
In the rest of this section we will give a sketch of the proof of the theorem. The detailed proof
of the theorem is in the Appendix. The proof is similar to that in [8].
The proof that the mechanism is truthful follows from the facts that the number of copies
allocated to each half is independent of the number of the bids of the bidders in that half and the
fact that pricing is determined by the VCG auction.
The proof of the competitive ratio is in two stages. The first thing to notice is that since the
bidders are split randomly into two sets the optimal revenue we can obtain from either of the sets
is on expectation nearly half of what we can obtain from the whole set.
The second thing is that the discounting factor of (1 − 6γ) ensures that w.h.p the eventual
winners in S (respectively T ) are charged at least as much as our allocation algorithm charges
during its fictitious run on the set T (respectively S) .
Note that the bound on the bidder dominance gives us an upper bound on n(i, p) that is the
number of bids on any bidders that is more than p. This is essential for our analysis.
Since the bidders are split randomly into two sets, the optimal revenue we can obtain from
either of the sets is on expectation nearly half that we can obtain from the whole set. Let
OPT (S, j) denote the revenue generated after j copies are produced by a fictitious run of the
optimal single price allocation algorithm on S. By Mcdiarmid’s Inequality and the bound on the
bidder dominance, with probability at least (1−O(δ)) we have OPT (S, ⌈M/2⌉) > (1/2−γ)OPT ,
where M is the final number of copies produced. Similarly we have OPT (T, ⌊M/2⌋) > (1/2 −
γ)OPT .
For the second stage we again notice that since the set of bidders was partitioned randomly
the number of bids more than p is w.h.p divided evenly among the two sets S and T . Again from
the McDiarmid’s Inequality and from the bound on the bidder dominance ratio we have that the
the number of bid in S that are more than p is w.h.p much more than (1− 6γ) times the number
of bids in T that are more than p (and vice versa).
9
Let ALG(S, ⌈M/2⌉)) and ALG(T, ⌊M/2⌋) be the revenue is generated by the fictitious run
of our allocation algorithm on S and T respectively. Now since the allocation algorithm is α
competitive we have that on expectation ALG(S, j) > αOPT (S, j). From this it follows that
with probability at least (1−O(δ)) the revenue we earned on expectation is more than
ALG(S, ⌈M/2⌉)(1 − 6γ) +ALG(T, ⌊M/2⌋)(1 − 6γ) > α(1 − 6γ)(1 − 2γ)OPT > α(1 − 8γ)OPT
5 Conclusion and Open Problems
The optimal competitive ratio for the allocation problem is open. [11] showed an upper bound
of e/(e + 1) for any randomized algorithm. The instance for which they show this upper bound
is when there is one bid of 1 and many bids of ǫ. For this particular instance, the following
algorithm gets a competitive ratio of 2/3: with probability 1/3, allocate just one copy and get
a revenue of 1, and with probability 2/3, run our algorithm. We conjecture that this algorithm
can be generalized to get a 2/3 competitive ratio. Also, a better upper bound proof will probably
have to consider instances with multiple peaks, where the ratio of the Di’s to the ai+1’s is large.
For the auction problem, the competitive ratio for the unit-demand case is quite small, and
that for the multiple demand case holds only asymptotically. Getting it to a reasonably large
constant (or proving that it is impossible) is an important open problem.
The most common scenario in sponsored search auctions is that the bidders have a constant
utility for multiple copies of the item, but with a daily budget. Our allocation algorithm works for
this case as well, but the reduction from the auction problem is not truthful. Borgs et al [4] give a
truthful auction for the offline case with budgets, using the standard random sampling techniques
with price offers. However, it is not clear how to extend their auction to the online case. The
difficulty is the same as that for the multiple-demand case, that the price offers are decreasing
over time. But unlike the multiple-demand case, there is no VCG auction for the budgets case,
so our reduction does not work.
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Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 4.2
We will now give the detailed proof of Theorem 4.2.
Let Allocate be the allocation algorithm that we use as our subroutine. The algorithm decides
to allocate x(S, j) copies at price p(S, j) when j copies are produced. So the Allocate(S.j) generate
revenue ALG(S, j) = x(S, j)p(S, j).
Let the optimal single price allocation algorithm decides to allocate x∗(S, j) copies at price
p∗(S, j) and the optimal revenue is OPT (S, i) = x∗(p, i)p∗(S, i). Let the Allocate(S, j) have a
competitive ratio of α. That is for all S and j,
ALG(S, j) ≥ αOPT (S, j)
If M is the number of copies of the item that are finally produced we denote the optimal revenue
as OPT = OPT (B,M).
Definition A.1. For any price p let n(S, p), n(T, p) and n(B, p) be the set of bids more that p
that are made by bidders in S, T and B respectively.
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Let Yi be the indicator variable indicating whether the bidder i is in S or not. Let fp(Y1, . . . , Yn)
calculate the number of bids more than or equal to p that are in S, that is fp(Y1, . . . , Yn) = n(S, p).
Note that since the bidders are randomly placed in S or T we have
E[fp(Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn)] =
n(B, p)
2
Let ci is the maximum change in the value of fp if we change the value of Yi. Note that ci is
equal to the number of bids of bidder i that are more than p, that is ci = n(i, p). But from our
assumption we have
1
η
<
OPT
n(i, p)p
So n(i, p) < ηOPT/p. Hence
∑
c2i <
ηOPT
p
(
∑
ci) =
ηOPT
p
n(B, p)
By McDiarmid’s Inequality we have for a fixed p
Pr
[∣∣∣∣n(B, p)2 − n(S, p)
∣∣∣∣ > γn(B, p)
]
< exp
(
−2γ2n(B, p)2∑
c2i
)
< exp
(
−2pγ2n(B, p)
ηOPT
)
(3)
Lemma A.2. With probability at least (1− 2|Q| exp(−2γ2/η))
OPT (S, ⌈M/2⌉) +OPT (T, ⌊M/2⌋) > (1− 2γ)OPT
Proof. Note that n∗(B, p)p > OPT . From Equation 3 we have that for a fixed p if p = p∗(B,M)
then
Pr
[∣∣∣∣n(B, p
∗(B,M))
2
− n(S, p∗(B,M))
∣∣∣∣ > γn(B, p∗(B,M))
]
< exp
(
−2γ2
η
)
Now since p takes values from the set Q so by union bound we have for any p = p∗(B,M)
with probability at least (1− |Q|exp(−2γ2/η)) we have
∣∣∣∣n(B, p
∗(B,M))
2
− n(S, p∗(B,M))
∣∣∣∣ > γn(B, p∗(B,M))
That is, with probability at least (1−|Q| exp(−2γ2/η)) there are more that (1/2−γ)n(B, p∗(B,M))
bids in S are more than p∗(B,M), for any p∗(B,M).
Recall that x∗(S, ⌉M/2⌉) is the optimal allocation to bidders in S when ⌉M/2⌈ . So we have
OPT (S, ⌈M/2⌉) >
(
1
2
− γ
)
OPT
Similarly with probability at least (1− |Q| exp(−2γ2/η)) we have
OPT (T, ⌊M/2⌋) >
(
1
2
− γ
)
OPT
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Corollary A.3. With probability at least (1 − 2|Q| exp(−2γ2/η)) we have the following two in-
equalities
x(S, ⌈M/2⌉) > α
(
1
2
− γ
)
OPT
p(S, ⌈M/2⌉
x(T, ⌊M/2⌋) > α
(
1
2
− γ
)
OPT
p(S, ⌊M/2⌋
From Equation 3 and Corollary A.3 we see that for any fixed p if p = p(S, ⌈M/2⌉) then
Pr
[∣∣∣∣n(B, p)2 − n(S, p)
∣∣∣∣ > γn(B, p)
]
< exp
(
−2γ2p(n(B, p))
ηOPT
)
< exp
(
−2γ2(1/2 − γ)
η
)
Using union bound we obtain that with probability (1−2|Q| exp(−2γ2(1/2−γ)/η)−2|Q| exp(−2γ2/η))
we have for all p = p(S, ⌈M/2⌉) ∣∣∣∣n(B, p)2 − n(S, p)
∣∣∣∣ > γn(B, p)
and for all p = p(T, ⌊M/2⌋) we have∣∣∣∣n(B, p)2 − n(T, p)
∣∣∣∣ > γn(B, p)
For p = p(S, ⌉M/2⌈) we have
n(i, p) < ηOPT/p < η
x(S, ⌈M/2⌉)
(1/2 − γ)α
< γx(S, ⌈M/2⌉) (4)
The algorithm decides to allocate x(S, ⌈M/2⌉) copies to bidders in S at price p(S, ⌈M/2⌉).
So by our mechanism we allocate (1 − 6γ)x(S, ⌈M/2⌉) copies to bidders in T . By the above
inequalities we know that with probability at least (1− 4|Q| exp(−2γ2(1/2 − γ)/η))
n(T, p(S, ⌈M/2⌉)) > (1− 6γ)n(S, p(S, ⌈M/2⌉)) + 2γn(S, p(S, ⌈M/2⌉))
Thus there are at least 2γn(S, p(S, ⌈M/2⌉)) losing bid in T that bids more than p(S, ⌈M/2⌉). From
Equation 4 we see that no bidder has more than γn(S, p(S, ⌈M/2⌉)) bids above p(S, ⌈M/2⌉). So
by the VCG auction pricing system each winner in T pays at least p(S, ⌈M/2⌉) per copy. So the
revenue we get from T is at least
p(S, i)(1 − 6γ)x(S, ⌈M/2⌉) = ALG(S, ⌈M/2⌉)(1 − 6γ)
Similarly the revenue we get from S is at least
ALG(T, ⌊M/2⌋)(1 − 6γ)
So with probability (1− 4|Q| exp(−2γ2(1/2 − γ)/η)) our revenue earned is at least
ALG(S, ⌈M/2⌉)(1 − 6γ) +ALG(T, ⌊M/2⌋)(1 − 6γ) > α(1 − 6γ)(1 − 2γ)OPT > α(1 − 8γ)OPT
So if γ = ǫ/8 and (2γ2(1/2− γ)/η)) > log(4|Q|/δ) then with probability (1− δ) the total revenue
earned on expectation is at least α(1− ǫ)OPT .
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